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A brief theoretical review of the current state of the art of embodiment research in
clinical psychology has been expounded in order to highlight the key role that embodied
conceptualization has on the understanding and explanation of several mental disorders,
such as eating disorders, schizophrenia and depression. Evidence has suggested
that mental disorders may be explained as disturbances of embodiment, from the
disembodiment to the hyperembodiment. In order to understand how some clinical
conditions are affected by cultural models, we propose and define a new framework called
Exbodiment, complementary to the Embodiment approach to cognition. Mental disorder
is strictly related to the subject-culture interaction that may be explained as a two way
process in which embodiment and exbodiment are complementary points of view. In this
perspective, embodiment may be seen as the “top-down” process, while exbodiment
the “bottom-up” one. The introduction of exbodiment conceptualization highlights how
subject is both receiver and interpreter of social influence. Subject is the target of a cultural
pressure and, at the same time, enacts its own embodied culture in world. Exbodiment
conceptualization may help clinicians to better understand and explain the role of culture
in the onset and maintenance of mental disorders.
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INTRODUCTION
Psychological processes are influenced by body morphology, sen-
sory and motor systems, and emotions (Glenberg, 2010). Embod-
iment conceptualization refers to the act of embody, the role that
body plays in shaping the mind.
Embodiment is a concept used in many different research
areas showing several related meanings. Embodiment has been
studied since the early 1970s and 1980s in various domains, like
robotics, philosophy, linguistic, neuroscience, and social psychol-
ogy (Reimann et al., 2012). In every one of these areas, a contin-
uum of theoretical approaches, ranging from strongly embodied
to unembodied, exists (Meteyard et al., 2012). Embodiment can
be conceptualized as a framework that can provide an unifying
perspective for psychological research. This is especially true for
the clinical psychology area and the psychopathological one,
where embodied cognition theory may allow a better understand-
ing of mental disorder patients (Fuchs, 2009).
Despite the significant role that embodiment perspective takes
for understand and explain psychological processes and disorders,
some limitations should be taken into account in order to redefine
the concept in a new perspective that focuses also on its comple-
mentary part, that is exbodiment.
The main aims of this proposal paper is to provide a brief
review of the state of the art of embodiment and its application
in clinical psychology, to highlight its potential limits and, finally,
to introduce exbodiment conceptualization and its promising
application in clinical psychology.
EMBODIED MIND
The conceptualization of Embodiment, or Embodied Cognition,
has been introduced between 1970 and 1980 in order to highlight
how psychological phenomena are grounded in body, especially
in organism’s sensory-motor experiences (Glenberg, 2010; Price
et al., 2012; Winkielman et al., 2015), and in social interactions
(Fuchs, 2009).
The Embodied Cognition Theory was specifically developed
in opposition to the mind–body separation and its latest develop-
ments made by cognitivism and computational science (Meteyard
et al., 2012). In this field computation was used as a tool to study
human mind, and specifically human cognition, adopting a sym-
bol processing approach: mind as a computer, totally detached
from body (Meteyard et al., 2012).
Embodied Cognition Theory proposes instead that a func-
tional unity between “low” level sensory-motor and corporeal
experiences and cognitive/perceptual processes exists; informa-
tion processing can accordingly be influenced, modified, or
entirely depends on body experiences (Jirak et al., 2010; Winkiel-
man et al., 2015). According to this perspective, cognitions and
emotions develop in the sensorimotor experience of the envi-
ronment (Fuchs and Schlimme, 2009; Price et al., 2012). The
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interrelation between mind, body, and environment allows sub-
ject to shape its particular vision of the world (Costa et al., 2013).
The key-concept of Embodiment is Action, who truly com-
bines mind and body (Fuchs, 2009; Glenberg, 2010; Meteyard
et al., 2012; Glenberg et al., 2013). The final target of the human
being is action/interaction with the world, which is guided by the
body; emotive and cognitive processes have their roots on body
because they are interlinked and exist to guide action itself (Fuchs,
2009; Glenberg, 2010; Meteyard et al., 2012; Glenberg et al.,
2013). Our body movement experiences allow us to recognize
how we anticipate events and interact with others (Cipolletta,
2013).
Embodiment biological basis research started in 1990 and
focused on the body’s role in shaping and building emotions,
conscience and others cognitive aspects of the mind (Varela et al.,
1992; Damasio and Dolan, 1999; Fuchs and Schlimme, 2009),
contributing to find experimental behavioral and neurological
evidence to the Embodiment Theory (Costa et al., 2013). One
of the first evidence of Embodied Cognition Theory came from
studies on different effects of head movements on cognition
(Reimann et al., 2012). Evidence suggests the hypothetical role
of mirror neuron system in embodiment processes (Price et al.,
2012).
EMBODIMENT IN CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY:
PSYCHOPATHOLOGY AS BODY DISTURBANCE
Evidence in clinical psychology has suggested that patients with
mental disorder embody both their pathology. Applying embod-
iment in clinical psychology help us to better understand how
body features may be taken into account in order to explain
mental disorder symptoms (Glenberg, 2010). Psychological and
psychopathological disorders may be explained as disturbance
of embodiment (Fuchs and Schlimme, 2009). From this point
of view, embodiment impairments have been classified in dis-
turbances that primarily affect the subject body or sense of self
(e.g., schizophrenia and depression), and disturbances that are
more related to the body image and body awareness (e.g., eating
disorder; Fuchs and Schlimme, 2009).
Studies that have suggested a major comprehension of three of
the main psychopathologies of our century (e.g., eating disorder,
schizophrenia, and depression) in relation to embodiment and
corporality themes have been briefly reviewed.
EMBODIMENT IN EATING DISORDER
Eating disorder as a body language
Embodiment has been suggested to play a key role in eating
disorders because of the strict link between body, culture and
identity. Our body, that is cultural, allows us to communicate
with others and with ourselves. In the interaction between body
and culture, identity and self-esteem play a key role and are
closely linked to body image. In this interaction, the external
features of my body (such as sizes, weight, muscles) are tools
that subjects use in order to show and promote their internal
life (Cohane and Pope, 2001). Body is then both physical and
symbolic. Body features lead subjects to express psychological and
internal meanings and emotions. Body is so a symbolic language
that allows subject to concretize emotions and internal states.
A recent study of adolescents in residential care and at risk
for eating and related body-image disorders has found that most
of the sample has experienced troubled events in their lives,
such as loss, abuse, deprivation, and parental neglect (Skarderud
et al., 2005). The authors have so theorized that adolescents at
risk of eating disorders experience the so-called embodiment of
troubled lives. Moreover, most of them explain their own need
for control, and the related feeling of chaos when they can not
control themselves and events. These features suggest that eating
disorder symptoms are bodily messages about patients’ difficulties
in controlling life events (Skarderud et al., 2005). The troubled
body may be a symbol of a troubled existence that lacks of
essential control over life conditions (Skarderud et al., 2005).
Eating disorder as an alienation of own body and emotions
Evidence has suggested and demonstrated that patients with
eating disorders are affected by disturbances of the way they
experience and get value to their own body (Stanghellini et al.,
2012). It is well-known that patients with eating disorder over-
value their body shape and weight. This disturbance may be
due to a specific disorder of lived corporeality, in particular to a
predominance of a specific dimension, that is the “lived-body-for-
others.” The “lived-body-for-others” concerns the awareness that
my own body is looked by other subjects and that it is an object
for them. This awareness allows me to experience the revelation of
“my being as object,” affecting then my own identity. As a result,
eating disorder patients are alienated from their own body and
emotions, and experience body as an object that is looked at and
judged by other subjects (Stanghellini et al., 2012).
Eating disorder as disembodiment expression
Bodily impairments, common in anorexia nervosa, allowed sci-
entific community to think that these patients experience impair-
ments in body awareness and contact. Anorexia nervosa has
been then proposed as a disorder of embodiment, a disembodi-
ment, that imply a disconnection with own body (Kolnes, 2012).
Patients with anorexia nervosa tend to dissociate head from body.
Evidence has shown that patients with anorexia nervosa
have significant impairments in their body awareness, muscular
tension, restricted breathing pattern, and postural disturbances
(Kolnes, 2012). Moreover patients show inability to relax and
a compulsive physical activity style (Kolnes, 2012). In addition,
they show confusion concerning bodily sensations and states,
and inability to describe bodily experiences. Sometimes they
report having not a body, and that they exist only as a subject
in their head. Common is the inability to perceive, understand
and respond to bodily signals, in particular concerning visceral
sensations related to hunger (Bruch, 1962, 1988; Pollatos et al.,
2008; Thornborg and Mattson, 2010). In addition, eating disorder
patients show specific personality traits (Melchionda et al., 2003;
Dalle Grave et al., 2013) and lower mindfulness capacities, if
compared with controls (Compare et al., 2012).
EMBODIMENT IN DEPRESSION
Depression as hyperembodiment
Depressive disorder has been conceptualized as an hyperem-
bodiment expression. In depressive patients body becomes
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conspicuous, heavy and solid. The body of a depressed subject
puts up resistance to the subject’s intentions and impulses (Fuchs
and Schlimme, 2009). Body is experienced as heavy, oppressive,
rigid and as an impairment to everyday normal life. Depressed
subject is not capable to embody phenomenal space and identify
himself with its own body. He focuses on bodily failure and,
as a results, he feels worthless, guilty and decaying (Fuchs and
Schlimme, 2009). In depressive disorder and melancholia, the
self is disconnected by the body and the sense of being alive is
lost.
Depression and body systems
Studies on depressed patients have moreover demonstrated a
strict link between motor systems and emotional processes (Slo-
man et al., 1982; Michalak et al., 2009, 2014). It has been suggested
that bodily manipulations may affect emotionally negative and
positive stimuli processing. For example, bodily movements such
as pushing a lever away from their body rather than pulling it
toward it, affect profoundly the emotionally processing of positive
or negative stimuli (Duckworth et al., 2002).
Mood states have direct effects on the way people walk. Then,
said patients walk with a lifting motion of the leg, whereas normal
control subjects propel themselves forward (Sloman et al., 1982).
Recently, a study has demonstrated the existence of a specific
gait pattern in depressed and said subjects; they are characterized
by reduced walking speed, arm swing, vertical movement of the
head, stronger lateral body sway, and a slumped posture. In this
pattern, a key role play speed and posture (Michalak et al., 2009).
Studies on embodiment in depressive disorder, have found that
embodied experiences have direct effects also on memory recall
(Dijkstra et al., 2007; Michalak et al., 2014; Winkielman et al.,
2015). In turn, negative memory recall and rumination have been
linked to the exacerbation and maintenance of depressed mood
(Compare et al., 2014).
Evidence shows that depressed patients that sit in a slumped
posture, during a laboratorial experiment of recalling, refer more
negative than positive words if compared with patients that sit
in upright posture; depressed patients in an upright posture
show, in fact, a balanced recall of positive and negative words
(Michalak et al., 2014). Moreover, it has been suggested that
depressed patients retrieve more easily and in shorter time memo-
ries when their posture is congruent with the mood relevant to the
memory, rather than incongruent (Dijkstra et al., 2007). Posture
has significant effects on power perception. Posture has been, in
fact, associated with the production of high or low social power
behaviors (Huang et al., 2011).
EMBODIMENT AND SCHIZOPHRENIA
Schizophrenia as disembodiment expression
Recent phenomenological approaches suggest that schizophre-
nia is a disorder of embodiment, that is a disturbance of the
embodied of self (Fuchs and Schlimme, 2009; Stanghellini, 2009).
The weak sense of self, the break of bodily functioning and the
disconnection of intercorporeality with others, lead to a loss of
the link between self and world. The disembodiments of the self,
of the self-object relation and of interpersonal relationships lead
patients to live and act as a soulless body or a disembodied spirit.
Schizophrenic patient experiences a sense of mechanization of the
body, feeling like a “psycho-machine” (Stanghellini, 2009).
In schizophrenia, personal and social spaces are affected.
Schizophrenic patients make significant errors in determining
boundaries of peripersonal space when interacting both with an
object and with a subject. This inability leads patients to show
impairment in social integration because they are unable to adapt
to social and common norms (Delevoye-Turrell et al., 2011).
Schizophrenia adversely affects also how patients embody
actual states and hopes for future (McCann and Clark, 2004).
Schizophrenia patients experience frightening, embarrassment
and sense of guilt for something that they have done or said.
Common is the lack of confidence in themselves, social isolation
and the reluctance to trust others.
The loss of their own body is strictly related to the loss of their
own mind. Patient loses his self because his body no longer acts
in the way that is familiar and trust for himself. These sensations
may increase if medications affect its own appearance (McCann
and Clark, 2004).
The embodiment of temporality, relationality and treatment
are significant themes for schizophrenic patients (McCann and
Clark, 2004). In particular, studies have shown that schizophrenia
is experienced as a catastrophic event that affects deeply patients’
temporality and lived time, because of delusions and hallucina-
tions (Embodied temporality; McCann and Clark, 2004). Illness
is also experienced as a mediator of social relationships that affects
their quality. Schizophrenia has a paradoxical effect on social
relationships, because of sometimes it helps at elicit support,
while sometimes damage social relationships (Embodied relation-
ality; McCann and Clark, 2004). Also antipsychotic medications
affect patients’ perception of their own body images and impair
the ability to have sexual and social relationships (Embodied
treatment; McCann and Clark, 2004).
Schizophrenia affects perception of objects, selves, and bodily
functioning (Fuchs and Schlimme, 2009).
Typical in schizophrenic patients is the impairment of the
ability to recognize familiar patterns of perceived objects, because
of the tendency to focus on details and the inability to grasp
the overall meaning of things (Fuchs and Schlimme, 2009). This
mechanism is maintained by the fact that if a body’s involvement
in the world is switched off, then the grasp of the things will
be impaired (Stanghellini, 2009). As a result, objects loss the so-
called ready-to-hand meanings that would help patients to give
practical means to the things of the world (Stanghellini, 2009).
Concerning the perception of the self, the alienation from
their own body allows patients to perceive themselves as external
spectator of their own perceptions, actions, and thoughts (Fuchs
and Schlimme, 2009; Stanghellini, 2009). They frequently expe-
rience a feeling of loss of presence that involves the detachment
from themselves, their actions and experiences and, in the severest
cases, a sense of emptiness (Stanghellini, 2009). The alienation of
bodily functioning leads patients to experience a disintegration
of daily live habits or automatic practices (Fuchs and Schlimme,
2009).
All of these elements are then organized in delusions that give a
new and rigid coherence and meaning to the environment (Fuchs
and Schlimme, 2009).
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EMBODIMENT’S LIMITS
As stated before, the concept of Embodiment is frequently used
in the basic and “simple” meaning of “mind and body reflect on
each other.” In this perspective, depressed subjects walk heavily,
schizophrenic patients act and think as in a mechanic body, and
anorexic girls perceive their own body fat also if it is underweight.
The embodied “revolution” concerns that somatic-cognitive
processes are carried out continuously in the here and now of
the intervention on environment. Theorists of enaction use the
term “simulation” to indicate the need to reverse the direction in
which senses are studied. We should start from the objective body
and understand how the brain receptors queries by adjusting the
sensitivity, combining posts, pre specifying the estimated values
according to an internal simulation of the expected consequences
of the action (Berthoz, 1998). The perception is action and action
influences the relevance and the cognitive load that is bound to an
object.
Action simulation is then directed toward some possible lines
of movement and not to all of potential actions. The notion that
philosophy uses for this “problem” is “intention.” Intentionality
selects data that seems most relevant for action. Actions on things
of the world and the interaction between people can be analyzed
in terms of “intentional carriers,” that may be explained as guides
for behaviors. Interaction between subjects, that is the relational
dimension, can also be seen as an over-ordered “channel” where
people take out preferences for actions. These intentional meta-
subjective goals are called “cultural intentions” because the social
group processes them for its members.
Subjects should be considered as intentional human beings.
While acting, they project their goals into the world. When these
goals diverge from the intentional plan, they intervene to actions
in order to correct them. But, at the same time, cultural patterns
influence individual behavior, soliciting them to reach a specific
typology of social and personal identity.
The “primacy” of the simulation, as stated by Berthoz (1998),
also reveals how human subject is not a simple detector of
objective data. Imagination is in fact a pillow-like filter between
the world and the subject. Perception is not just correct or not.
The world shows different things as the perceiver faces it with
different intentions. In analogic terms, imagination and simula-
tion are complementary processes with which people exchanges
symbols founded in cultural environment. We call this “space”
Peripersonal Symbolic Sphere, that is the participative area in
which action with objects and interaction with similar is possible
in a structured space where cultural norms manifests possibility
or prohibitions.
EXBODIMENT: THE ENACTION OF THE EMBODIED CULTURE
Embodied Cognition and Enaction Theory (Varela et al., 1992)
are theoretical perspectives that share the same background.
Interaction between subjects and cultures can be then explained
as a two way process: embodiment and exbodiment. Oxford
Dictionary states: “Embodiment (noun): a tangible or visible
form of an idea, quality, or feeling,” as in “she seemed to be
a living embodiment of vitality.” Embodiment concerns a “top-
down” process and people are conceived as targets of cultural
pressure, that is formed of social representations or “ideas” (Farr
and Moscovici, 1989). As in Perception Theory, we state here
a “top-down process of social models” because subject directs
his/her behavior on the basis of cultural solicitations that he/she
had encountered. Our social–psychological perspective assumes
here the “collective-mind” point of view (Mead, 1934).
We suggest that the interaction between subject and culture is
a two way process. We call “exbodiment” the “bottom-up” pro-
cess. Exbodiment indicates how subjects “enact” their embodied
cultures, how the body express ideas, which are never as similar as
to the ideal type of a society. This occurs in Peripersonal Symbolic
Sphere, where culture is seen as the framework from which (top-
down) norms are conceived by people as continuous strength to
cope with the influence (Lakoff and Johnson, 1982).
The verb “to enact” comes from philosophy of law language.
It underlines the specific ontology of a bill or a legal proposal,
because the statue of legal sentences are social facts with a certain
grade of objectivity. Action is a more general word, when enaction
stresses the institutional nature of the people’s activity. We can not
just say that “one acts,” but we propose to say that an oriented
enactions, acted by subjects and structured by a culture, construct
his/her own social world.
Exbodiment indicates how subjects “enact” their embodied
cultures. For example, exbodiment refers to the process applied
by anorexic girls to organize the social-echo-system in order
to control their attempt to embody the “fitting form” detected
in cultural symbols. Embodiment concerns the incoming shape
from a culture to a subject, while exbodiment refers to the never
ending process by which subject expresses his adhesion to cultural
and social model.
EXBODIMENT IN CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY
Many psycho-pathological conditions, in particular eating disor-
ders, are sensitive to the social influence. Many clinicians refer to a
“social epidemic” event for anorexia showing how factors related
to disease can be found also in the socio-cultural dimension of
the phenomenon. Also depressive syndromes represent a growing
trend in today’s society. Social psychology and cultural anthropol-
ogy are therefore called to develop explanatory models of these
diseases.
Social influence is a complex phenomenon that shapes imagery
and “simulation plans” that subjects develop in their mind. In this
perspective, subject might not be considered only as a target of
social influence. Subject is a speaker, an amplifier and an “inter-
preter” of its “embodied simulation,” that is often unconscious.
Anorexic and bulimic patients are not just passive subjects. They
in fact organize their environment and use all of their relational
power to influence it.
The “relational effects” of a disease are considered as com-
plex factors that modulate the expression of behaviors, such as
anorexic weight loss. Subjects explore (enact) their social envi-
ronment in order to test the possibilities to conform it to his own
pathological and distorted assumptions. As stated by Jean Piaget,
the knowledge reaches the object only through the transformation
brought by an action and knowledge is structurally related to the
action (Ceruti, 1993). The world is not something that is given
to us, but is something in which we take part through the way by
which we move (Varela et al., 1992). In recent decades, people’s
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FIGURE 1 | Embodiment–exbodiment in cultural dialectic model.
Life Space (Lewin, 1964) has increased in complexity and exten-
sivity, because the communicative sphere of contemporary society
includes visual media, social networks and “covered myths” that
underlie a given society.
Individual and complex societies are in an unbalanced rela-
tionship, because an individual has little power to “change” a state
of society that is implemented by powerful agencies and in places
far away from their possibility to intervene. Fashion houses that
parade manuequine in world’s capitals are not affected by any
action of a 15 year old girl. What is out of subject action space
is reached by people imagination.
Peripersonal Symbolic Sphere is wider than interactive
peripersonal space. Claiming that social communication must
bann the lean bodies because they could push thousands of
girls to lose weight uncontrollably does not make much sense,
both because of its impracticality, and because it goes to affect
creative freedom. Our suggestion is that it is possible to answer to
the eating disorder social epidemic alarm not just preventing or
prohibiting the exposure to the infection stimuli (i.e., the thinning
vip of the moment, as a medical optic tend to suggest) but
reinforcing the subjective initiative of the Peripersonal Symbolic
Sphere.
CONCLUSION
This proposal paper has provided a brief review of the state
of the art of embodiment and its application in clinical psy-
chology, in particular in the understanding of the onset and
maintenance of eating disorders, depression, and schizophrenia.
Limits of Embodiment perspective have been then discussed in
order to introduce the conceptualization of a new complementary
perspective, called Exbodiment. Promising applications of Exbod-
iment in clinical psychology, in particular in the explanation of
anorexia, have been then discussed.
Eating disorder, schizophrenia and depression are the most
common mental disorders of our century that directly and indi-
rectly affect also our health. For example, depression is a primary
risk factor for cardiac disease, influencing heart through biolog-
ical and behavioral mechanisms (Maier et al., 2007; Compare
et al., 2011a,b, 2013). Also eating disorders, in particular obesity,
is a complex disease where somatic and psychological/psychiatric
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factors contribute to severe distress and poor health-related qual-
ity of life (HRQL; Petroni et al., 2007).
The introduction of exbodiment conceptualization highlights
how subject is both receiver and interpreter of social influence.
Eating disorder should be considered not only as a result of
influences spread by social imaginary, but also as a way to be
“cool” for girls. According to this perspective, control behavior
over food, typically performed by anorexic girls, can be explained
as a manifestation of the exbodied theme of girl’s life: the incor-
poration of an aesthetic influencing model.
Enaction theory suggests that changes in personal beliefs
depend on actions that a subject makes in his environment.
Enacting epistemology remembers that for a living system, the
meaning of interactions is not required from the outside, but is
the result of the organization and history of the system (Varela
et al., 1992). Subject learns by acting, even if in presence of percep-
tual “distortions,” as in the case of dismorphophobic perception.
In this perspective, it has been suggested that cognitive dissonance
strategies (Festinger, 1962) may change subjects’ attitudes against
beliefs (Stice and Presnell, 2011).
Social passivity may therefore be considered one of the most
maintaining cause of mental disorder in our contemporary soci-
eties. The more a subject is sustained to be active in the dialectic
between embodiment and exbodiment, the greater will be the
dynamics of personal identity which could help people to find
their place in the society. Because of inequality in influencing
power between symbolic agencies, as media-systems and common
people, cultural symbols and images could crush personal life.
Then, in order to go out of the so called “social emergency”
for eating disorders and depressive syndromes, it is necessary to
sustain subjective initiative in all educational contexts (better if in
in-group situations). Empowering the enactive side of the Periper-
sonal Symbolic Sphere could help girls to be critical evaluators of
social models.
Figure 1 shows as different “accentuations” or “dominances”
of one’s embodiment–exbodiment dialectic may help to better
understand subjective coping strategies to cultural influences.
Cultural milieu is the social representation incubator in which
subject receives identity models that are embodied in his indi-
viduality. Subject replies to social models through his own enac-
tion modality (exbodiment). The interface between “individual
mind” and “collective mind” is constituted by the simulation–
imagination system (representation system). Potential results of
embodiment–exbodiment interaction are represented in the right
side of the figure. Psychological disorders have been reconsidered
taking into account their effects on social-relational environment
(micro-culture). From the coping effect point of view, eating
disorders show an over-exbodiment to cultural model, while
depressive disorders show action inhibition. Schizophrenic con-
dition may be characterized as an original disarticulation of social
influences and subjective coping link.
A two-way consideration of social diseases would allow clinical
psychology to understand how pathological behaviors are result of
a complex interaction between cultural, individual and relational
factors. In our point of view, clinical psychology should consider
that “healthy” actions should not be limited to states defined
by diagnostic manuals. The conditions set by psychiatry are
“stabilized organizations” in the exbodiment–embodiment rela-
tionship. Clinical psychology, like other areas of applied psychol-
ogy, should therefore adopt appropriate psychosocial categories
that allow it to extend its point-of-view even at sub-clinical con-
ditions. In this perspective we have tried to illustrate how social
and community psychology could support clinical psychology to
better understand mental disorders, adopting suggestions from
enaction and embodiment–exbodiment theories.
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